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In the Suprente Court of the
State of Utah

FRANK MANWILL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
ERNEST OYLER, and
LETA OYLER,
Defendants and Appellants.

CASE
NO. 9346

Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of fucts as given in the brief of defendants and appellants is considered sufficienrt.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY, IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANTS
AND APPELLANTS.
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POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS COMMENCED WITHIN THE STATUTORY PERIOD DURING WH[CH SUCH
ACTION MlGHT PROPERLY BE COMMENCED.
POINT ill
THE AGREEMENT ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION.
ARGUMENT

POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT RULBD CORRECTLY, IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANTS
AND APPELLANTS.
The motion to dismiss of def-endants and appellants
was based on two eontentions, i.e., (1) that the complaint
fails to state a cause of aetiO!ll upon which relief can be
granted, and (2) that all the claims, aotioos, rights, or
causes of action alleged or attempted to be alleged in fue
complaint have been ·barred by the statute of limitations
(R. 4).

This Oourt has stated in Liquor Conrtro[ COmmission
vs. Atlhas, 121 Ultah 457, 243 P. 2d 441, the following rule
with respect to the granting or denial of a motion to dismiss:
"A motion to dismiss should not be granted unl€SS it appears to a certainlty that plaintiff would be entitled to
no reH.ef under any state of facts which could be proved
in support of its claim."
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This rule of law was reiterated in Blaclmam vs. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d, 157; 280 P. 2d, 453.
In each of the above drted eases, a motion to dismiss
had been grnnted by tile trial CoiU11:, and eaJoh case was
reversed on appeal in aoc&dance wi1Jh the rule of law stated
above.
An eX)amination orf the reoonl beforre the OoiU:It, with
an underlying knowledge of the above quorted rule orf law,
would seem .1Jo indicate that the trial Judge in rtms case
exercised his discretion correctly in denying tile motion of
defendanrts and aJppeHanrt::s, inasmuch as the complaint orf
the plaintiff certainly does nort di,sclose a sirtuation in which
''plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under amy state of
facts which could be proved in support olf his claim.''

The compla.im on its f:ace alleges an oral contract between plaintiff and defendants in Octob&, 1957, whereby
defendants agreed to repay plaintiff for a ·cerlain principal
sum wlhich plaintiff had e~nded to pay fo~ a farn1 then·
occupied by defendants. The parties further agreed that
defendants would pay plaintiff fior certain personal propetry Wlricih was transferred to defendants by plaintiff in
1954 (R. 1 and 2). There i1s no allegation in the complaint
of any claim, liability, debt or agreement befure 1957. The
complaint does allege that the 1957 agreement was based
on ce:MJa.in payments and certain transfe,rs orf personalty
which had taken place during rt:!he years 1950 through 1954,
(R. 1 and 2) and tt is upon this allegation that 3.1ppel1ants
base their principle contentions in this appeal.
Under the rule of law stated ah01ve, the allegations of
plaintiff's complaint are sufficient to show that plaintiff
is entitled to relief, if the facts exist as alieged in the com-
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plaint. We therefore respectfully corntend that· the trial
Oorurt ruled correctly. in denying defendants' motioo to ~
miss.

POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS COMMENCED WITHIN THE STATUTORY PERIOD DURING WH!ICH SUCH
ACTION MIGHT PROPERLY BE COMMENCED.

Appellants allege that there are certain aspects of
plaintiff's complaint which woruld indicate a theocy that
some eause of action against defendants accrued in favor
of plaintiff during the years 1950-1954 (A-ppellant's Brief,
page 4). Appellants further contend that a cause of aotion
on vhe theory of assumpsit arose in favor of plaintiff dwing the years 1950-1954, and that the statute of limitations
forr such cause orf action commenced to run rut the time
plaintiff made such payments or eooferred any h...anefit upon
defendants. On rfJhat basis, appeUants ·conclude that the
1957 agreement alleged in plaintiff's eomplaint must necessarily have been an "acknowledgment of an exising liability" or a "promise to pay the same", which vidlates Section78-12-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, because it is not
in writing.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendants agreed to
repay plaintiff for certain "sums which he had expended
in making payments on a furm now occupied by defendants" (R. 1). The complaint further alleges an agreement
· by defendant to pay for certain personalty whtch had been
transferred to them in 1954 (R. 1 and 2). Notlhing whatever in the record before the Court indicates tJh.e rel,ationsbip of t!he parties, their conduct, or the circumstances -un-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

der which these transactions took place. Indeed, there· is
no indication from the record of any personal c01Il1Jact whatever between plaintiff and defendants before 1957. Respondent contends that the mere making of payments ·and
transfer of personalty does not give rise to an implied promise by defendants to make immediate payment therefor
to plaintiff. An action in assumpsit may be based on eirfuer
an express or implied contract (4 Am. Jur., Assumpsit,
Section 2). We assume from appellants' discussion of ·this
point that they -contend that an implied contract arose between plaintiff and defendants during the years 1950-1954.
Respondent admits the possibility that such an agreement
might be implied in law, burt suoh implication-could be drawn
only :f.irom the conduct o[ the parties or the ·circumstJa.nces
of tile case. Certainly such an implicatioo is one which
could ·be made only after the taking of evidence as to these
matters, and full knowledge of all of ·the facts, and could
not be made from the present record.
Evern if the ·creation of a contract by implication were
possible from tlhe present record, what are the terms of
such implied contract? When, if such implied. cont~act is
to be created, were defendants to make payment to plaintiff?
The above questions would appear· to. be e:xtremely important in dete,:rniining when the statute of limitation8·6n
such implied contract commenced to run. Apl>ellant ·.cites
cer1Ja.in authorities in support of his contention that the
statute of limitations begins to run at the time plain:tiff
makes any payment or confers ·any benefit om defendants
(Appellants' brief, page 3). Neither of the authorities qited
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by appellant would seem to support this statementf based

on the fucts of this case.
The statute of limitations on any cause of action based
on contract begins to run only after a breach of such contract. This contention is sustained by one of the authorities cited by appellants (34 Am. Jur., limitation of Acti.OillS,
Section 113). Irt is started therein, "As the rule is otherwise
expressed, a right of action accrues whenever such a breach
orf durty or contract ha:s ooCWTed, or such a wrong has been
sustained as will give a right to bring and sustain a suit."
The rule has also been stated as follows:

"The general rule· governing the commencement of the
running of the statute is ;that the statutory .period is
oompurted from the time when the right of action which
the plaintiff seeks to enforce first aocrues, that is, ordmarily in an action based on a contract, as soon as
there is a breach of contract."
(Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Section 2004)
This Court has said on this point:

"It is a rule of universal application that a cause or right
of action arises the moment an action may be maintamed to enforce it and that the statute of limitations
is then set in ·motion. The test, therefore, is, can an
action be maintained upon the particular cause of action in question?"

Sweetster v. Fox, 43 Utah 40, 134 Pac. 599. See also Last
chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 P. 2d 952.

Also, there are several recognized exceptions to this
genera1 rule (supra, Seotioo 2022). One of these exceptions, quoted as follows, could be particularly applicable
here:
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''Where the plaintiff has undertaken a continuous performance though consisting of several items, and the
defendant, though he has eX!pressly or impliedly promised to pay rt:Jherefor, has not promised to do so at
any particul'ar time."

Hence, in order to determine the time of commencement of the rtmning of rthe statute of limitaions in an action based on !implied contract, one must :first detennine
when a brooch has oocuvred, and whe1JheT one of the exceptions to the general rule is applicable. This, orf course,
is impossible without implying ~the tenns of payment, which
implioatioo, it is respectfully contended, is impossible from
the presenlt record.
The foregoing is, we feel, illustrative of our contention
that the creation of an implied contract is only possible
with 'a full knowledge of ·all of 1Jhe facts orf the case. Hence,
although respondent freely admits the possibility that an
implied contract is capable of proof in this case, the opposite is likewise true. If the proof is such that a contract
cannot be implied from the conduct of the parties oT ciTcumstances of the oase, then it follows that the oral agreement of 1957 is not an acknowledgment olf an existing liability, but is, as respondent alleges, an agreement of first
instance. It would then follow rthat such oml agreement
could not violate Section 78-12-44, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, and ·it would further follow that this action based on
such agreement was commenced well within the period
provided in 78-12-25 (1). This Section provides as follows:
"Within four years: (1) an aotion upon a contract, ob-ligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in
writing . . . "
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So long as the possibility exists that plaintiff can prorve
these allegations, under the State of facts as all.eged, he
shOuld not be denied his day in Court by fue granting of a

motion :to dismiss.
Appellarnts contend that by demanding interest from
the dates that the original payments on the farn1 were made
by plaintiff and by t!he use of the word "repay" plaintiff's
complaint somehow supports a theory that some cause of
action in ~avor of plaintiff arose in 1950-54 (Appellant's
brief, page 4). The theory .o[ plaintiff is dear enough on
the face of the complaint, without searching for hidden
meanings. _We fail to denote any significance Whatever in
the use of the wru-d "repay" as compared to .!'pay", or any
otheT word in ·the context of plaintiff's complaint.
With respect to interest, the .complaint alleges that
the agreement ad: 1957 was foc the repayment of the principal sum only (R. 1). The prayer foc interest was added
by ICO!tlnSel in accordance with Sectioo 15-1-1, Utah Code
. Annotated, 1953, and the cases noted in the annotation following rthat section. The law is quite dear that if plaintiff
is entitled to ·recorver the principal sum alleged in his complaint, he is entitled rto recover interest on those monies
·at the statutory rate :f.irom the time the monies were paid
to the present. We fail to see that this 'prayer for interest
denotes any theory rtJhat a cause of action arose in favor
of plaintiff in the years 1950-54.
On the basis of the foregoing, respondent respectfully
contends that the agreement of 1957 alleged in plaintiff's
complaint was an agreement of first ins1Ja.nce, that a breach
. ·of rthat agreement occurred on the part of the defendants,
and that plaintiff commenced an action against defendants
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for such breach within the statutory period provided for
the commencement of such action.
POINT ill
THE AGREElVIENT ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUFFlCIENT CONSIDERATION.
It appears on the face of the complaint that the agree-

ment of the pa.rties ilil 1957 was based on a consideration,
on plaintiff's part, of past benefits conferred on defendants. It is true ;tJhat in respondent's Answer to Petition for
Intermediate Appeal, reference was made to this as "past
consideration.''
HJowever, as Mr. Williston points out, the term "past
oonsidemrtion", is self-cnntradiotory (Williston on Contmcts,
'Dh:ird Edition, SectiO!ll 142). More p~operly, we refer to
the consideration which we contend supports the agreement
between the parties, as "moral cons~detVation." The underlying ques:tiO!ll of whether a moral obligation is sufficient
to constitute "moral consideration", is discussed art length
by Mr. Williston in his treatise. (See Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Seetions 142, 147-149) ~
The general rule with respect to the application of this
doctrine is found at 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 107,
wherein the following statement is made:
"When, however, the past conside,ration consisted o[
material pecuniary benefit, which although not moved
by a previous request, was conferred upon the promissor in such circumstances as to create a moral obligation and has not been ex:hausted by furnishing consideration for another legal obligation already per-
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formed or still enforceable, there is considerable authority for the view that it will support a subsequent
exerutocy promise. ~o render i:his doctrine applimble,
it must appear: (1) That the service or other consideration moving from the promissee conferred an actual material or pecuniary benefit on the pvomissor,
and not merely that it resulted in detriment to ;the
promissee; (2) That 1:he promissee e~ed to be
compensated rthm-efior, and did not intend it to be a mere
gift or gmtuity; (3) · That fue circumstances were
such as to create a moral obligation on the pwt of the
promissor; and (4) That the benefit received has not
eonsrtituted the consideration for :another p1..omise already performed or still legally enforceable."
It wou1d appear that all of the four criteria mentioned
above are present in this particular ease. Certainly defendants received an actual material or pecuniary benefit, _in
that rthey have beoome the legal owners of real p:rop._orty
and ifJhe personal property purehased by plaintiff wit~ his
money. Secondly, from the very beginning of this transaction, plaintiff expected to be reimbursed foc the monies
expended, and at no time intended these monies to be gifts
or gmstuities. Thi:nlly, the facts related abo~e certainly
are such as ;to create the highest kind of m()['al obligatioo
on the part of the defendants to pay for tJhe land which
they presently occupy and are making their living from.
Fourthly, the benefit received has not constituted the consideration for any other promise either already performed

or still enforceable.
The doctrine of moral consideration is discussed in
some detail ·at 8 ALR 2d, page 781. Numerous cases are
cited from various jurisdictions which have adopted the
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doctrine, and in summarizing the annotation, the following
statement is made,
"While some Courts, particularly in the earlier cases,
have been inclined to recognize a. mo~al obligation as
consideration for an executocy promise oruy where the
obligation rested upon a pre-existing legal liability,
the trend of modem authorities is definitely to rthe effect that a pre-e~srti.ng legal liability is nort essential
in order that a moral consideration be sufficient to
support an executory promise and ·that a moral obligation is suf:tiicient to surpport an executory promise
where the promissor has originally received from the
promissee something of value in the fmm of a pecuniary
or material belllefLt, under such circumstances as rto
create a ~moral oblibation on the part of the promissor
to pay for what he received, even though there was no
antecedent or contemporaneous promi·se or request,
and no legal liability at any time prior to the subsequent expressed promise.''
No Utah oases have been found, either supporting or
rejecting this doctrine. However, as suggested by Mr. Will~, ·this doctrine has been devised by the Courts in o~
der to overcome a defense whidh, although technically valid,
has no substantial foundation in justice.
We recognize that the application of such a doctrine
should be limited; however, respondent respectfully contends that the ~acts of rthis case bring it within that class
of oases to which this doctrine is applicable and properly
applied, in order that justice may be done.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits, on the basis of the
foregoing, that the trial Court properly denied defendants'
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motion rtJo dismiss, and that the action of the trial Cowt
in so doing should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSON, NOVAK, PAULSON
AND TAYLOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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